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There remains ample research and debate on the topic of soft power and how nations are 
implementing it abroad and what implications that creates for informing U.S. policymakers. 
China’s growing presence and interests within Africa present an opportunity to explore its use of 
soft power. This combined social science research study aims to use both qualitative and 
quantitative methods to investigate how China is implementing soft power through mechanisms 
of technology and education in Africa. The findings suggest that both education and technology 
are found in most African states and thereby present opportunities for soft power mechanisms to 
be exerted onto African audiences, with Morocco, South Africa, and Kenya containing the 
highest presence of both variables. A case study of education and technology within Morocco 
conferred two dominant narratives of opportunity and government alignment to positively 
convey Chinese government and traditional culture. The combination of technology, education, 
and soft power tools reinforces current literature stating the importance for further exploring soft 
power as a concept, understanding its application from non-Western audiences, and 
contextualizing the role of cultural heritage and economic prosperity within China’s soft power 
strategy and aspirations in Africa. This research can be used as a baseline for further studies on 
soft power application or its efficacy within African audiences which is important for analysis 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of China on the world stage is causing concern and creating complexity for 
Western policymakers that increasingly fear and question China's intent, growing influence, and 
perceived power across global audiences. The current Interim National Security Strategy 
explicitly cites that China's increase in power along with its mounting assertiveness elevates its 
threat potential, becoming a concern to U.S. national security. Alongside Russia, China is no 
longer considered a regional adversary. Now being considered a growing and great power, 
mitigations and considerations within U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy are required. 
Multiple disciplines continue to explore trends of China's increasing influence to better 
understand, inform, and create awareness to what is currently happening globally. From political 
science to government think-tanks and intelligence agencies, the dynamics and measurements of 
power become increasingly important for policy planning and strategy.  
Questions concerning the extent of and means by which China's rising influence and 
power implicates U.S. national security is complicated by its global scale. The relative hard and 
soft power discussions and estimates aim to study where, how, and what tools China is using to 
expand and exert its own interests around the globe; however, soft power remains difficult to 
grasp. Defining, studying, or even measuring soft power and its effectiveness is highly debated 
and requires further discussion. Therefore, this social science research study will intend to 
narrow the focus regionally to within Africa to understand how China applies soft power through 
education and technology with a mixed methods approach utilizing statistical data, content 
analysis, and a case study.  
First, a discussion on the current understanding and challenges conceptualizing soft 
power will be discussed. How soft power is perceived from a Chinese perspective will be 
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considered as well as the application of soft power to the concept of cultural diplomacy. Next, 
Power Transition Theory and China Threat Theory will also be discussed to provide fidelity on 
why China's power assessments, such as soft power, matters to the West. Literature surrounding 
soft power will be useful in analyzing China's approach within Africa, providing opportunity for 
additional insights to China's soft power strategy aimed at influencing audiences abroad. The 
influence soft power can have on persuading mindsets and cultural attitude towards China is 
critical when discussing how they counter and challenge Western discourse, explaining why 
policymakers are concerned. Therefore, a focus on education and technology as a fundamental 
conduit to access of information will provide a unique understanding of soft power dynamics 
















Soft Power, Cultural Diplomacy, and the Chinese Perspective 
Understanding Soft Power and its Limitations for Universal Application 
           Joseph Nye is a prominent political scientist who is attributed with coining the concept of 
soft power used across disciplines. Nye describes soft power as a "descriptive rather than a 
normative concept" that is powerful enough to be used for twisting minds, either for good or 
malicious intent.1 In discussing the notion of state power, Nye explains just how prominent soft 
power is as it can go virtually unnoticed in everyday life and throughout history despite being a 
concept frequently debated amongst scholars, state leaders, or media outlets since the 1980’s.2 
Nye's description of soft power as a state political tool with the "ability to obtain 
preferred outcomes through attraction and persuasion"3 is commonly understood and referenced 
amongst political scientists or economists when defining soft power, especially in comparison to 
hard power, which is understood as a coercive tool executed via elements of economic or 
military force traditionally associated with a state’s status. Therefore, while hard power is 
commonly understood through tangible elements of state power, soft power is more complex and 
involves a confluence of intangible phenomena that shapes how people think and act such as 
culture, ideology, or institutions.4   
 Shaun Breslin expands on soft power, discussing how it is widely recognized despite 
being highly varied in its understanding as a conceptual definition amongst different audiences 
 
1 Nye, Joseph S. “Why China Is Weak on Soft Power,” Harvard Kennedy School, January 17, 2012, 1-15, 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/why-china-weak-soft-power. 
2 Nye, Joseph S. (2012) China and soft power, South African Journal of International 
Affairs, 151, DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2012.706889 
3 Ibid., 151. 
4 Wang, Hongying, and Yeh-Chung Lu. “The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications: a Comparative 
Study of China and Taiwan.” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 56 (June 19, 2008): 425. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560802000191. 
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throughout different disciplines or countries.5 He argues the lack of a common definition means 
there is not a shared understanding necessary to better comprehend the concept, particularly 
when looking at China's analytic approach to soft power. His argument for a different cultural 
and non-Western approach to defining the term is recognized amongst many scholars. 
Furthermore, Nye concludes that China's attempt at soft power aims to promote a positive 
national image abroad. Nye argues that despite China’s embrace of soft power, its attempt at 
promoting a positive image, sometimes referred to as its “charm offensive,” has largely failed.6 
Nye considers China’s soft power initiatives weak due to negative public opinion polls in the 
U.S., Europe, South Korea, Japan, and India.7 Furthermore, he asserts that soft power is not a 
zero-sum game since there are attractive aspects to every culture, however, China’s internet 
censorship and various human rights abuses are largely contributing to its ineffective soft power 
influence abroad.8 
           Similar to arguments made by Breslin, research by Blanchard and Lu would counter 
Nye’s conclusions, arguing there is a lack of understanding of soft power across literature and 
policy, particularly when assessing China's approach to soft power. Blanchard and Lu think 
similarly to Breslin, asserting the term is used too loosely since it is not well understood and 
arguing for a better conceptualization of the term as a target that can be measured so that it can 
be properly assessed and informative to policy such as the Interim U.S. National Security 
Strategy.9 The document mentions China 15 times, more than any other country, and specifically 
 
5 Breslin, Shaun. Publication. The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power.’ Chatham House, February 2011. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0211pp_breslin.pdf 
6 Nye, Joseph S. “Why China Is Weak on Soft Power,” 2012. 
7 Ibid., para 9.  
8 Ibid., para 4, 8, 12.  
9 Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Fujia Lu. "Thinking Hard About Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the 
Literature on China and Soft Power." Asian Perspective 36, no. 4 (2012): 565-589. doi:10.1353/apr.2012.0021. 
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references soft power notions when it states, “by restoring U.S. credibility and reasserting 
forward looking global leadership, we will ensure that America, not China, sets the international 
agenda, working alongside others to shape new global norms and agreements that advance our 
interests and reflect our values.”10 Therefore, Blanchard and Lu argue that through better 
contextualization of soft power there can be ways to measure it, assess its efficacy, and as a 
result, form recommendations for policymakers, such as national security priorities that shape 
foreign policy.  Since there is a lack of shared understanding, there is a lack of methods to 
measure it. Therefore, estimates of Chinese soft power fail to systematically understand it as a 
phenomenon with measurable variables that can be observed and exploited as a target. They 
highlight that the study of soft power involves multiple ways in which the topic can be explored 
or measured from conceptualization to operationalization within a country and audience. The 
way in which soft power is defined, implemented, dispersed, and received from multiple 
audiences varies, and therefore, they argue the Chinese perspective needs further understanding 
to recognize its application and mechanisms.   
Additionally, the notion “sharp power” as discussed by Walker et el., also finds 
limitations to Nye’s definition in applying the tactics of how modern authoritarian states, such as 
China and Russia, are using, controlling, manipulating audiences. They argue that despite 
increased access to information via modern technology, the restriction of free expression, 
censorship, independent institutions, and manipulation of information for political control is a 
distinct form of power undermining democracy.11  Therefore, they assert that the intent of 
authoritarian states, such as China, to influence, attract, and persuade is separate from soft power 
 
10 United States White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, Washington D.C.: 2021. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.  
11 Walker, Christopher, Shanthi Kalathil, and Jessica Ludwig. “The Cutting Edge of Sharp Power.” Journal of 
Democracy 31, no. 1 (2020): 127. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0010.  
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through the censorship of information to audiences and enabled through the technology 
revolution in recent decades. 
China’s Perspective on Soft Power  
Wang et al. explore the Chinese perspective of soft power and agree with critics of Nye, 
who believe that the concept of soft power needs to be fully understood and is currently limited 
by Nye’s definition. They describe how soft power has been largely embraced and debated 
within Chinese and Taiwanese audiences and literature since Nye coined the term. He discusses 
how soft power has several translations, first appearing in Chinese discourse in 1997, and has 
only increased in modern Chinese academic and policy discussions.12 Since appearing in Chinese 
discourse, the concept transforms amongst Chinese audiences who conceptualize it differently 
from Western audiences and should therefore be understood differently when analyzing its 
application from a Chinese perspective. They argue that a Chinese perspective on soft power is 
broader, involving multiple entities that can subtly persuade through logic, morality, and 
example. Therefore, this understanding of soft power accepts culture and values as a major 
component, like the Nye definition, but it extends the definition to encompass the role of 
morality and need for appeal in both domestic and foreign audiences. This definition goes 
beyond a state’s ability to influence another state and instead infers “cultural and domestic 
institutions and values” which create “the ability to generate compliance in a society by moral 
example and persuasion.”13 
In their discussion of how Eastern audiences such as China interpret soft power 
differently from Nye and the West, they also claim that science and technology are equally 
 
12 Wang, Hongying, and Yeh-Chung Lu. “The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Implications: A 
Comparative Study of China and Taiwan.” (June 19, 2008): 426.  
13 Ibid., 427-428. 
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important tools of hard and soft power which can be applied beyond states and within 
organizations themselves.14 They assert that Chinese discourse views technology beyond its role 
within economics and through an ability to influence within enterprises via “brand names, human 
resources, and coordination capacity.”15 They assert that China perceives science and technology 
as important tools of soft power and considers them vital to countering America’s cultural 
dominance internationally, not just contributing strength to its economy. Therefore, science and 
technology become integral to operationalizing factors that Wang et al. identify as China’s 
interpretation of their soft power strength: Chinese culture, development model, and a peaceful 
foreign policy.16 In summary, Wang et al. argue Nye’s assumptions of soft power’s role in 
influencing other states is too narrow when applying it to a Chinese model, which defines soft 
power differently. To China, highlighting Chinese cultural heritage, stressing China’s growing 
economic prosperity, and applying soft power domestically and abroad is the ability to create 
national coherence and government legitimacy that influences people through morality and the 
example that is inherent to Chinese traditional heritage.17 
Scholarly discussions on the concept of how to understand soft power become important 
for government agencies and policy makers that are responsible for informing foreign policy and 
national security strategies.  The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a 
prominent think-tank that publishes extensively on elements of Chinese soft power. Glaser and 
Murphey, on behalf of the CSIS, assert that despite wide acceptance and debate amongst Chinese 
audiences of the concept of soft power, there also lacks a, “comprehensive, coherent national 
soft-power strategy” despite strategically “disparate” policies aiming to implement it. Glaser and 
 
14 Ibid., 430. 
15 Ibid., 430.  
16 Ibid., 439. 
17 Ibid., 431. 
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Murphey contend that, despite Chinese efforts to use soft power abroad by promoting socialist 
views that counter Western diplomacy and values, there will be an aversion to directly and 
overtly compete with the West.18 The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 2020 Annual Report to 
Congress on China's military and security developments claims China will continuously seek to 
strengthen its soft power through boosting its economic and technological strength in addition to 
thorough educational exchange and Confucius institutions that aim to carry the campaign of the 
Peoples Republic of China to audiences abroad.19   
Furthermore, research by Kalimuddin et al. cites President Xi Jinping’s 2017 speech as 
pivotal to considering soft power within international perceptions of power beyond traditional 
hard power paradigms of “gross domestic product, troop numbers, nuclear missiles.”20 
Kalimuddin et al.’s observations are in alignment with government publications and national 
security strategies as he highlights China’s soft power that aims to control dominant narratives 
and decrease opposition. He uses the South China Sea and Taiwan as two prominent examples in 
which China attempts to operationalize soft power to exert control over conversations, aiming to 
be seen as a “preferred partner” striving to establish “peace building mechanisms.”21 Therefore, 
by controlling and reinforcing China as a peaceful and optimal actor in the Pacific region, China 
is aiming to counter any Western narratives that claim China as hostile and oppressive. 
 
18 Glaser, Bonnie S., and Murphey, Melissa E., Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: 
Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World: A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative. United States: 
CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies), 2009. 10.  
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090310_chinesesoftpower__chap2.pdf 
19 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020. 
Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense, 2020. 14, 131.  
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-
FINAL.PDF 
20 Kalimuddin, Mikail, and David A. Anderson. "Soft Power in China’s Security Strategy." Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2018): 114. Accessed June 12, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26481912. 
21 Ibid., 117-119. 
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Cultural Diplomacy and its Application to Soft Power 
Commonly discussed in parallel to soft power is the term “cultural diplomacy,” which is 
also seen as a state tool that is part of a larger public diplomacy promoting a state’s culture and 
foreign policy.22 Research by Mark Simon discusses how cultural diplomacy applies to soft 
power as it aims to persuade foreign audiences through attraction.23 Research by Becard and 
Filho further analyze the concept of cultural diplomacy as instruments of China's modern 
diplomacy in exerting cultural soft power.24 Their study is limited to media, cinema, and U.S. 
based Confucius Institutions as they explore their role as cultural diplomacy tools within a 
Chinese soft power framework. Their findings focus on the cultural promotion of soft power 
through media and education examples, particularly highlighting Confucius Institutes as the most 
profound use of cultural diplomacy abroad, which is only growing in the U.S.25 Understanding 
both cultural diplomacy and soft power’s close correlation is important when contextualizing its 
role in Belt and Road Initiative (B.R.I) discussions. B.R.I. was coined in 2013 by Chinese 
President Xi Jinping in his speech “One Belt, One Road”26 which announced a global scale 
infrastructure projection aiming to increase China’s international footprint by connecting China 
to Europe via Central Asia.27 B.R.I. is commonly discussed in context of a hard power strategy 
through the economic components of China’s investment abroad. China’s strategic goals 
 
22 Simon, Mark. A greater role for cultural diplomacy. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
2009. 1-2.  https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20090616_cdsp_discussion_paper_114_mark.pdf 
23 Ibid., 1. 
24 Becard, Danielly Silva Ramos, and Paulo Menechelli Filho. “Chinese Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments in China’s 
Strategy for International Insertion in the 21st Century.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 62, no. 1 
(2019). Para 1, 10. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329201900105.  
25 Ibid., 1-2, 26-27.  
26 Cai, Peter. “Understanding China's Belt and Road Initiative.” Lowy Institute. Lowy Institute, March 22, 2017. 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-and-road-initiative.  
27 Yu, H. (2016). Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank. Journal of Contemporary China, 26(105), 353. 
doi:10.1080/10670564.2016.1245894 
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describing an intent to expand its footprint globally, economic gain, or political affluence is more 
recently attributed to their Vision 2035, 14th Five Year Plan, and Go Out Policy.   
  Despite an increase in research on soft power and China's investment and strategy 
abroad, there remains debate on its definition, and therefore a coherent understanding of what 
soft power is and how to define, characterize, measure, and assess China's use or efficacy. 
Discourse aiming to understand China’s strategy abroad is critical to understanding and 
navigating the increasingly tense geopolitical climate between China and the West, strategic 
rhetoric, and broader global trends. The implications of understanding soft power as a tool of the 
Chinese state is fundamental to informing U.S. policy and national security priorities. 
The Threat of China's Rise: Power Transition Theory and China Threat Theory 
           Both Power Transition Theory and China Threat Theory have been traditionally used 
since the conclusion of WWII in explaining global geopolitical trends and Western reactions to 
China's perceived increase in power. When discussing aspects of national power, particularly via 
hard or soft power dynamics, it is essential to grasp both of these theories which have been 
prominently discussed in both the U.S. and China. Power Transition Theory presents a realist 
view that states react to shifts in hierarchy of power based on measures of relative national power 
positions. Political scientist scholar A.F.K. Organski was the first to coin the theory in 1958, 
arguing that a hierarchy amongst states existed based on these perceptions of power in which 
dominant, great, middle, and small power states coexisted or challenge the system. There remain 
many debates and ongoing discussions regarding how to define or measure relative power, 
especially as technology and globalization continue to change global political, economic, and 
social dynamics. However, despite being largely recognized across disciplines there are several 
critics of this theory, which they believe relies heavily on realist assumptions or a narrowed 
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Western perspective. Power Transition Theory assumes state dynamics are determined by power 
politics and hierarchy, with the following assumptions: dominant states hold the most power, war 
is always possible and even inevitable, and power politics will continue to fluctuate.  
Research by Chan challenges these assumptions driving Power Transition Theory and 
considers the theory to be misleading and over-generalized in describing relationships of other 
states since the interpretation of state perception is singular and overly provocative when 
describing the international system.28 He contends not all states may think the same way or want 
to change or challenge the international system. He also asserts that China still has more growth 
to do before reaching the power and status which the U.S. has achieved.29 Furthermore, he 
argues that wars, more often than not, are initiated by declining states and not those rising in 
power, thereby contradicting the belief that rising states are those who act to challenge the 
powerful. Jeffrey also challenges the theory as she argues the prospect of war is unlikely, the 
notions of power hierarchies focus more on war than peace, and states are largely 
mischaracterized due to a "misappropriation of historical precedents."30 Similarly, Broomfield 
argues that Power Transition Theory is outdated and does not apply to the modern context of the 
Chinese state, which is different from the Russian and German contexts to which Power 
Transition Theory was originally applied. The idea of a state’s power driving international 
dynamics and how power is applied or perceived is a commonality found within these debates. 
The China Threat Theory is based on the confluence of discourse describing China as a 
credible state threat to other powerful states which is similar to the realist logic driving Power 
 
28 Chan, Steve. China, the US, and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique. 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2008. 7. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203940662.  
29 Ibid., 7.  
30 Jeffrey, Renée “Evaluating the ‘China Threat’: Power Transition Theory, the Successor-State Image and the 
Dangers of Historical Analogies,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 2 (2009): pp. 312, 321, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10357710902895186. 
 12 
Transition Theory. China Threat Theory attempts to apply aspects of the Power Transition 
Theory with a focus on the ideological, economic, and military challenges China presents as a 
rising power to the West.31 However, similar to Jeffrey and Chan, research by Broomfield argues 
this theory relies on Western interpretations of Chinese rhetoric, actions, intent, and policy, both 
domestically and abroad. There is an underlying assumption that China poses a threat solely 
because they challenge or counter U.S. interests and the international status quo. Broomfield 
asserts the theory fails to acknowledge China’s economic partnerships and engagement globally, 
inferring there is a possibility of China liberalizing and accepting the current international system 
“as a legitimate, stable, and peaceful force."32 These assumptions are problematic for many who 
view China’s state intent skeptically. This is especially true for those in favor of China Threat 
Theory and the current tone of U.S. and many Western national security policies, threat 
assessments, and strategic rhetoric. Furthermore, Broomfield argues that China's rise and actions 
to prepare itself as a credible nation are being misattributed as antagonistic by the West and can 
be supported by China's benign record.33 The notion of a benign record is largely challenged 
globally by those who caution against China's environmental track record, humanitarian 
concerns, and territorial violations in the region. This logic and debate aligned with the China 
Threat Theory recently made headlines as China’s embassy in London criticized the tone of 
NATO and EU summits in 2021. The Chinese embassy claims there is an exaggeration of the 
China Threat Theory in European strategic discussions which misjudge and slander China’s 
image and actions abroad.34 
 
31 Broomfield, Emma V. “Perceptions of Danger: The China Threat Theory,” Journal of Contemporary China 12, 
no. 35 (2003): pp. 299, https://doi.org/10.1080/1067056022000054605. 
32 Ibid, 266.  
33 Ibid., 284.  
34 Blanchard, Ben. “China Urges NATO to Stop Exaggerating 'China Threat Theory'.” Edited by Jacqueline Wong. 
Reuters. Thomson Reuters, June 15, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/china-urges-nato-stop-exaggerating-
china-threat-theory-2021-06-15/.  
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Despite these theories largely explaining U.S. rhetoric, policy, and national security 
priorities, some scholars pose a need for new analytic frameworks and further understanding of 
power politics. Understanding these theories is essential since they remain commonly discussed 
and relevant as they are prominent in U.S. strategic thought. There remains a need for further 
insight to characterizing the notions of "threat" or "power" that describe international relations, 
particularly in ongoing conversations of how China imposes on the West. 
China’s Soft Power in Africa 
China’s interests within the African continent continue to grasp the attention of 
researchers, Western intelligence analysts, and the U.S. government. As mentioned, many 
conversations discuss China’s growth in investment and diplomatic engagement in Africa, 
particularly through its B.R.I. initiatives and international and diplomatic forums where China 
focuses on “strengthening political and economic ties.”35  Daniele Carminati regularly discusses 
the role of China’s soft power dynamics internationally and asserts that the economic approach 
within China’s soft power strategy makes it particularly appealing to developing nations in Latin 
America and Africa. Therefore, by studying where China is investing and engaging in industry 
and governments abroad, the opportunity for economic approaches to assessing the appeal of 
“considerable economic gains following the completion of a high-speed railway or a new 5G 
network” offered by technology that Wang et. al highlight can also be studied alongside the 
benefits of “educational and professional opportunities offered by cultural institutes” through a 
soft power lens aiming to “cultivate goodwill towards China.”36   
 
 
35 Carminati, Daniele. “Pushing the Boundaries of Soft Power: The Controversial Chinese Case.” E International 
Relations, July 11, 2018. 2.  https://www.e-ir.info/2018/07/11/pushing-the-boundaries-of-soft-power-the-
controversial-chinese-case/.  
36 Carminati, Daniele. “The State of China’s Soft Power in 2020.” E International Relations, July 3, 2020. 2.  
https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/03/the-state-of-chinas-soft-power-in-2020/. 
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There exists ample research on China’s use of soft power within Africa, however, it is 
largely limited to the role of Confucius Institutes, public opinions surveys in audiences abroad, 
or the presence and content of media and news outlets. The research by Blanchard and Lu 
discussed previously on the understanding of soft power highlights research by Liang that 
focuses on China’s use of economics as soft power within Africa.37 Furthermore, they support 
Liang’s claim that economic payments are part of China’s soft power application in Africa who 
use the payments to generate appeal alongside narratives promoting its “culture, political values, 
and economic model.”38 Therefore, Blanchard, Lu, and Liang support the claims by Wang et al. 
that the Chinese perspective on cultural heritage and its prosperous economic models are tools 
for influence and therefore soft power mechanisms. Furthermore, Blanchard and Lu remark how 
Africa presents a unique and favorable region for China to implement soft power since China’s 
political values, cultural values, and economic goals are not universally embraced or attractive to 
other nations and cultures, which suggests why “China’s soft-power efficacy seems greater” in 
Africa as a developing region compared to developed nations.39  
Research by Procopio, for example, aims to study the effectiveness of Confucius 
Institutes specifically as a Chinese cultural soft power tool in South Africa. Their findings 
suggest that since the establishment of Confucius Institutes in 2004 as a foreign policy tool to 
spread Chinese language and culture, these institutes alone have been partially effective in 
promoting a positive perception and acceptance of China.40 She argues that Confucius Institutes 
are largely overestimated in their longer-term impact on the perceptions of local audiences, 
 
37 Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Fujia Lu. "Thinking Hard About Soft Power:(2012): 585. 
38 Ibid., 585.  
39 Ibid., 585.  
40 Procopio, Maddalena. “The Effectiveness of Confucius Institutes as a Tool of China’s Soft Power in South 
Africa.” African East-Asian Affairs, no. 2 (June 2015): 120-121. https://doi.org/10.7552/0-1-2-155. 
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particularly students pursuing studies within a Confucius Institute. Therefore, she contends that 
exposure and experience beyond attending a Confucius Institute is needed to create a larger 
impact in their future lives that advocates for China.41 Her research does support that Confucius 
Institutes are a useful tool of soft power since they promote Chinese culture and serve as a 
gateway for audiences to create experiences. However, only looking at Confucius Institutes and 
an education approach to influence audiences abroad as a soft power Chinese cultural 
mechanism is limiting.  
Similar to the research by Procopio, Wang et. al, and Blanchard and Lu who underscore 
the need to understand China’s implementation of soft power, particularly in areas where its 
economic expansion is high in developing regions such as Africa which Glaser and Murphey 
highlight in the CSIS report.42 Glaser and Murphey identify investment, peacekeeping and 
humanitarian aid, exchange programs, diplomacy, and multilateral institutions as instruments of 
Chinese soft power in Africa. Their analysis contends that engagement between Morocco and 
China is mostly within senior levels of government with officials on both sides asserting political 
legitimacy. Therefore, there remains an “incomplete understanding of the culture, values, and 
ways of life of average African citizens”43 within Africa. The lack of understanding and 
consistent engagement signifies the need to better understand how soft power is being 
implemented amongst African audiences beyond senior levels of government. Furthermore, 
Carminati asserts that strategic narratives a country aims to convey in creating attraction and 
 
41 Ibid., 120-121.  
42 Glaser, Bonnie S., and Murphey, Melissa E., Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States: 
Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World: a Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative. 2009. 2.  
43 Ibid., 6. 
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exerting influence are important when looking at the efficacy of soft power in audiences 
abroad.44 
 
44 Carminati, Daniele. “Contextualizing Soft Power’s Analysis: The Value of Attractive National Features.” E 




How does China apply soft power through methods of education and technology in Africa? 
 There exists ample research and national security estimates on the growth of China’s 
influence throughout the globe.  The implications of China’s B.R.I. and extent of China’s hard 
and soft power footprint are evolving and remain important to informing the U.S. government on 
global trends for policy decisions and enragement abroad. As the topic of soft power continues to 
be explored and debated, there remains opportunity for further analysis that can build on existing 
theory. A mixed-method approach that narrows the topic of soft power can aim to better 
understand how it is implemented and understood through a case study and a data driven 
approach. Together, a qualitative and quantitative analysis offers a well-rounded research 
strategy aiming to gauge China's soft power actions abroad by posing the question of how China 
is applying soft power through specific methods of education and technology in Africa. More 
often, technological investment is analyzed through an economic lens as an element of hard 
power. By approaching how technological investment and education are implemented in Africa, 
a better understanding of these elements as tools of soft power can be understood. This research 
will aim to identify and understand trends of education and technology being operationalized in 








METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS  
A combined methodology will be used to provide numerical data and nuance in 
understanding how both elements of education and technology are being used specifically as soft 
power tools amongst Africa’s 54 countries, excluding overseas or disputed territories. Soft power 
will be narrowed to two elements: education and technology. Education is traditionally discussed 
in the context of soft power discussions; however, technology is not, being more commonly 
addressed relative to Chinese investment in B.R.I. from economic or hard power discussions. 
Discussion of these two variables, specifically in the context of a soft power analysis, allows for 
the topics to be discussed in context together with a narrow focus that aims at extracting soft 
power implications. Additionally, non-Western sources of information will be used as much as 
possible based on available data in order to provide a non-biased lens that aims to provide the 
Chinese and African perspective on how these two variables are being operationalized through 
soft power influence.  
Only countries with each variable present will be used for analysis with the assumption 
that there will be some countries in Africa that have neither variable present. The education 
variable will only focus on established Confucius Institutes within Africa and will not include 
institutional exchanges or research partnerships due to constraints of finding reliable data.  A 
Confucius Institute will be defined as a “non-profit public institutions affiliated with the Ministry 
of Education of the People’s Republic of China whose stated aim is to promote Chinese language 
and culture, support local Chinese teaching internationally, and facilitate cultural exchanges.”45 
The technology variable will encompass a broad range of digital equipment or planned contracts 
for hardware and software to include: surveillance equipment, 5G equipment, smart city projects, 
 
45 “Confucius Institutes Around the World – 2021.” Dig Mandarin (blog). Dig Mandarin, February 2021. 
https://www.digmandarin.com/confucius-institutes-around-the-world.html. 
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joint ventures/subsidiaries/commercial partnerships with digital firms, security equipment or 
technical training, telecommunications equipment, and information and communications device 
equipment. Both education and technology will be the two variables being analyzed in context of 
soft power which will be defined as: exerting influence on others through attraction of cultural 
principles, heritage, values, and polices that obtain desirable outcomes that do not rely any form 
of forced coercion.46 
First, a quantitative analysis through descriptive statistics, data coding, figures, and charts 
will provide a baseline understanding of the presence of each variable for opportunity as a soft 
power tool. Analysis of the geographical footprint of these aspects through a heat map will 
illustrate the extent of where Chinee education and technology is present throughout Africa. 
Descriptive statistics and data coding will allow each variable to be compared for trend analysis 
and identification of outliers suggesting which states China has created opportunity to apply 
these tools. The data coding will contextualize the numerical data into an interval scale that will 
categorize each variable by country. Based on data results, one country designated as an outlier 
containing a higher percentage of both variables will be used for the qualitative case study 
analysis due to a greater amount of data available for analysis.  
The amount of education and technology, as defined above, will be first counted for 
analysis before the data coding.47 The amount of each variable present by country will be 
compiled for statistical analysis. The geographical presence of each variable, depicted via a heat 
map, will illustrate the presence and extent of each variable based on the coded data for each 
 
46 Nye, Joseph S. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 616, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 94–109. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716207311699.  
47 Hoffman, Samantha. “Mapping China's Tech Giants: Covid-19, Supply Chains and Strategic Competition.” The 




country. The data coding will be key to contextualizing the numbers and identifying any trends 
or outliers. Based on the standard deviation found in education and technology, the data coding 
scale of four categories will be used, ranking the countries as minimal, low, moderate, or high 
based on the presence of each variable. Each variable by country will be separately coded first 
(Table B). Next, a sum of the coded numbers for each variable will be used to categorize the 
countries based on the presences of both variables. The final data code designated for each 
country will consists of four categories: not included, low, moderate, or high (Figure 3). The not 
included category will encompass countries that have do not have any variables present while the 
other three categories represent the amount both variables are present. Next, one country will be 
selected for the qualitative case study analysis from the identified outliers quantified as 
categorically high. A country designated as having a higher variable presence will be used for the 
case study since there is a higher chance of available data for analysis.  
The qualitative analysis will be used to determine narrative trends of each variable as 
tools of soft power. Narrative trends will be defined as common words or patterns used to frame 
ideas associated to China, particularly its culture, politics, economics, or ideology. Content 
analysis will be conducted using information from ten different non-Western sources based on 
the release date, availability of English, and accessibility from a U.S. IP addresses. Both Chinese 
and local media from the chosen African state will be used as well as a public Facebook page 
from a Confucius Institute, official Chinese press releases, and publicly accessible informational 
web pages from a Chinese government website, Chinese-based university, and Confucius 
Institute. Since the aim of the research is to assess China’s application of soft power to African 
and Chinese audiences of a particular African state and domestically in China, only recent 
Chinese sources, since 2000, will be used. Academic research that has studied Confucius 
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Institutes will be used to supplement historical and political context. The content analysis will 
identify narrative trends associated with each variable to demonstrate how each variable is being 
communicated to a specific audience in Africa or interested audiences in China as a soft power 
tool. Major narrative trends from the content analysis will be discussed within context of the 
country’s diplomatic history with China, and specific narrative elements found with education 
and technology.  
In an analysis of how soft power is implemented through a combination of education and 
technology in Africa, the research is expected to identify geographic trends within Africa and 
designate the states where China is prioritizing both variables as soft power tools and how they 
are being used as instruments of soft power on subject audiences. The presence of both elements 
by country is being analyzed to assess where both elements are present and therefore possess 
greater opportunity to be utilized as soft power tools for influence. The qualitative and 
quantitative analysis is expected to identify how education and technology are tools of soft 
power. States with strong diplomatic and ideological alignment with the Chinese government are 
anticipated to have a higher presence of both variables with narratives reinforcing China’s 
cultural heritage and economic growth positively. The qualitative analysis is expected to identify 
how each variable is being communicated and presented through narrative trends exposed to 
Africans and Chinese audiences as soft power tools. The independent variable is the presence of 
Chinese technology and education within Africa via Confucius Institutes, technology services, or 
digital hardware. The dependent variable is the frequency of these specific examples of 
education and technology and the narrative trends associated with each as tools of soft power for 
China. The null hypothesis is an absence of education and technology and the narrative trends 
associated with each variable as tools of China’s soft power campaign within Africa. 
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Research Question: How does China apply soft power through methods of education and 
technology in Africa? 
  
What is the footprint? 
• Provide geographical trends and baseline, 
identify outliers  
 
What narratives are being used?  
• Provide nuisance to the narrative trends associated 
with each variable as a soft power tool 
• Analyze only non-Western sources 
  
Method: Quantitative 
• Statistical Analysis & Data Coding  
 
Method: Qualitative 
• Case study and Content Analysis 
 
 
Display: Charts, Tables 
  
 
Display: Table, Code Tree, and Discussion 
  
 
Data Sources: Information available online that is 
accessible, reliable, and in English 
• ASPI Database 
• Chinese Blog: Dig Mandarin list  
 
Data Sources: 10 online, relatively recent, and 
assessable English documents: 
• Two Chinese government sources (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of China press 
release and Chinese Foreign Ministry informational 
web page on Morocco as a African Member State 
following an Forum on China-African Cooperation 
Summit in Beijing) 
• Four Chinese news articles from three Chinese media 
companies (China Daily, Xinhua Global Times, 
Xinhua Net) 
• Two Moroccan news articles from a Moroccan media 
company (Morocco World News) 
• One official informational web page from a Moroccan 
based Confucius Institute (Confucius Institute at 
Morocco University Mohammed V) 
• One article from a Chinese based University 
discussing a visit by the Morocco Hassan-II 
University Confucius Institute (Shanghai International 
Studies University) 
• One Facebook web page from a Moroccan based 
Confucius Institute (Confucius Institute at University 
Hassan II Casablanca) 
  
 






Quantitative Analysis: Presence of Education and Technology Throughout Africa  
The research focuses on two variables of education and technology applied in the context 
of soft power. For the quantitative analysis two different secondary data sources were used to 
compile information for each variable. Education was measured using a list of Confucius 
Institutes that is published online and regularly updated by “Dig Mandarin,” a Chinese sponsored 
blog dedicated to promoting and providing resources for audiences abroad to learn Mandarin.48 
Technology was measured using the database from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute's 
(ASPI) International Cyber Policy Center.49 Although the data for technology is being derived 
from a Western source, this database compiles information from Chinese sources that monitor 27 
different Chinese technology companies. The database is frequently updated since June 2021 and 
robust, containing 3,800 global entries and 38,000+ data points. 
First, data compilation from the two sources above depicts the amount of Confucius 
Institutes in the education variable and the various types of sources for the technology variable 
by country (Table B). Following accumulation of data, data coding is used to contextualize the 
amount of each variable (Table B). Descriptive statistics aided in determining trends of both 
variables, particularly the mean, mode, standard deviation, and range that aided in building the 
scale for data coding of each variable (Table 2, Table A). The averages of both technology and 
education throughout Africa are similar, as most countries within Africa had at least one of the 
variables present. The standard deviation and range were higher with technology, suggesting the 
amount of technology between countries is more varied and there is a potential for a higher 
 
48 “Confucius Institutes Around the World – 2021.” Dig Mandarin (blog). February 2021.  
49 Danielle Cave, Samantha Hoffman, Fergua Ryan, Nathan Attrill, Audrey Fritz, Vicky Xu, Daria Impiombato, Lin 
Li, Alex Joske, and Elise Thomas. “Mapping China's Tech Giants,” 2021. 
https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/homepage/.  
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presence in certain countries. However, the mode of technology, which was zero, compared to 
education, which was one, suggests more countries have education present. This can be 
illustrated in the pie charts, (Figure 1) indicating the individual and total amount of each variable 
throughout Africa.  
   
 
Overall, both variables were found in 87 percent of African nations, equating to 47 
countries. Education occupies a larger footprint within Africa by 19 percent since education was 
found in 82 percent of countries compared to the 63 percent of countries with technology 
present. Furthermore, Figure 2 displays the data from Table B demonstrating a greater range for 
technology (blue) within a country while education (yellow) is found more consistently across 
countries. Therefore, although some countries may contain a higher amount of technology, the 
Figure 1: Percentage of Education and Technology within Africa 
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presence of education alone was found more often. The presence of both variables suggests there 
is opportunity for Chinese application of soft power. 
Data coding was based on the presence of each variable in order to contextualize the 
amount of each variable by country. The standard deviation and range for each category 
determined the range for the interval scale specific to each category. Countries were designated 
on a scale of one to four which represent a minimal, low, mode, or high presence for each 
variable. The combined coded numbers of the variable were analyzed to yield a combined data 
code of low, minimal or high (Table B, Figure 3). The compiled data code by country of both 
variables is depicted on the heat map (Figure 3) indicating the northern and southern regions 
contain a higher presence of Chinese education and/or technology. Both the data chart (Figure 2, 
Table B) and the heat map (Figure 3) identify three “high” outlier countries: Kenya, South 
Africa, and Morocco. All three outlier countries are considered to maintain diplomatic and 
economic ties to China. 
 
 















































































































































































































































































Qualitative Analysis: Case Study on Soft Power Narratives Associated with Education and 
Technology in Morocco  
Historical and Modern Context of Diplomatic Relations 
 According to the China’s Foreign Ministry online information from 2006, diplomatic 
relations between Morocco and China were established in 1958 when the first trade agreement 
 Education Technology 
Significance Code  Code  
Minimal Presence 0 0 
Low Presence 1 1 to 3 
Moderate Presence 2 3 to 6 
High Presence 2 or more 6 or more 
Table 2: Coding Table for Education and Technology  
 
Figure 3: Heat Map Depicting the Combined Presence of Education and Technology 
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was signed.50  Both nations regularly refer to each other as a key strategic partner sharing 
political and ideological values that harness mutual understandings and shared respect for state 
politics.51 Since 1996, there have been regular diplomatic meetings with 13 official visits by 
China to Morocco and six visits by Morocco to China.52 Moroccan King Mohammed VI 
conducted the most recent visit to China in 2016.53 China has regularly sent students and medical 
teams to Morocco since 1975, and offers opportunities for Moroccan students to study abroad in 
China.54 The history of Moroccan-Chinese relations dates back six decades and has evolved to 
become a strong strategic partnership with bilateral relations that support China’s B.R.I. and 
various efforts including the forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the China-Arab States 
Cooperation.55 Additionally, China highlights Morocco’s support of China’s sovereignty stance 
towards Taiwan and human rights,56 two topics often criticized by the West. 
 Today, both countries continue to reinforce their strong government relationship via 
media outlets, official government statements, publications. Morocco views China as an 
important strategic partner critical to the Moroccan economy, trade, and technological pursuits. 
Following the COVID-19 pandemic, both leaders, King Mohammed and President Xi Jinping, 
held an official meeting virtually, resulting in a Chinese vow to support Morocco as needed. 
According to Moroccan World News, there have been seven million Sinopharm doses donated to 
 
 50 “Morocco.” china.org.cn. Chinese Foreign Ministry, October 10, 2006. 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/183433.htm#:~:text=China%20and%20Morocco%20established%20
diplomatic,views%20on%20many%20international%20issues. Para 2.  
51 “President Xi Jinping Speaks with King Mohammed VI of Morocco on the Phone.” Fighting COVID-19. 
President Xi Jinping Speaks with King Mohammed VI of Morocco on the Phone, September 1, 2020. People's 
Republic of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdfyyq/t1811229.shtml.  
52 Ibid., para 2.  
53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the People's Republic of China, President Xi Jinping Speaks with King Mohammed 
VI of Morocco on the Phone § (2020). 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/kjgzbdfyyq/t1811229.shtml.  
54 Morocco.” china.org.cn. Chinese Foreign Ministry, October 10, 2006. Para 1. 
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the People's Republic of China, § (2020). 
56 Morocco.” china.org.cn. Chinese Foreign Ministry, October 10, 2006. Para 1. 
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Morocco by China, reaching at least 18 percent of their population.57 Overall, the historical 
record of between both states demonstrated a strong diplomatic relationship built on a shared 











Education and Technology Content Analysis 
A content analysis aimed to identify narrative trends of both variables amongst 10 
sources from accessible websites of the official Chinese government, Chinese institutions, 
Chinese Confucius Institute Facebook page, and online news articles from Chinese and 
Moroccan media outlets (Table C). The content analysis produced two dominant narratives of the 
promotion of opportunity and the reinforcement of government alignment. Academic research by 
Yellinek, Mann, and Lebel provides supplemental information to lend additional context to 
Confucius Institutes within Morocco. Morocco currently has three Confucius Institutes including 
 
57 Saf Kasraoui, Safaa. “COVID-19: Morocco Receives Half Million Doses of Sinopharm Vaccine.” Morocco 
World News, May 2, 2021. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2021/05/341231/covid-19-morocco-receives-half-
million-doses-of-sinopharm-vaccine.  
 
Morocco: Content Analysis 
Narrative Trends  Education Technology 
Opportunity ✔ ✔ 
Cultural Heritage & Language ✔   
Travel  ✔   
Quality of Life ✔ ✔ 
Convenience ✔ ✔ 
Employment ✔ ✔ 
Government Alignment ✔ ✔ 
Diplomatic & Political ✔ ✔ 
Cultural Values ✔ ✔ 
Economic   ✔ 
 
Table 3: Narrative trends of Online Sources 
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the Confucius Institute at Mohammed V University in Rabat, the Confucius Institute at Hassan II 
University in Casablanca, and the Confucius Institute at Abdelmalek Essaadi University in 
Tangier. All of these Institutes have been established post-2000, with the first opening in Rabat 
in 2008.58 All three Confucius Institutions offer language classes and various cultural courses 
ranging from Chinese calligraphy to art, cooking, politics, economy, government, and public 
institutions.59 According the Confucius Institute websites (Table C, sources 8-10), the benefits of 
cultural exchange are promoted through frequent comments about the value of bridging Arabic 
language and Arabic culture with Chinese Mandarin and Chinese practices. Therefore, the 
education variable reinforces literature on soft power that Confucius Institutes are tools for 
cultural immersion and influence.  
The narrative of opportunity through the promotion of language and cultural classes to 
gain knowledge reinforces notions of convenience through the ability for any Moroccan age 
group to attend Confucius Institutes, with classes being offered to children as young as seven.60 
Besides the notions of opportunity through cultural exposure and convenience, the ability for 
travel to China is also highlighted. The academic competition, the “Chinese Bridge” begins on a 
national level and selects a winner amongst the three participating universities that have 
Confucius Institutes to compete internationally in China by demonstrating proficiency in 
Mandarin and Chinese culture.61  In 2016, a Moroccan student placed third overall in the 
international competition.62 The Facebook page for the Confucius Institute at University Hassan 
 
58 Roie Yellinek, Yossi Mann, and Udi Lebel. Chinese Soft-Power in the Arab world – China’s Confucius Institutes 
as a central tool of influence 39, no. 6 (November 6, 2020): 526. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1826843.  
59 Ibid., 527. 
60 Liangyu, ed. “Spotlight: Confucius Institute Sets up Bridge for China-Morocco Cultural Exchanges.” Xinhua Net, 
November 10, 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/10/c_137595617.htm. 
61 Roie Yellinek, et al., Chinese Soft-Power in the Arab world – China’s Confucius Institutes as a central tool of 
influence 39, (November 6, 2020): 527.  
62 Ibid., 527. 
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II Casablanca (Table C, source 10) contains all the elements of opportunity, reinforcing the 
various benefits of pursing courses and exploring Chinese culture. The cover photo of the 
webpage is a cartoon illustration depicting a harmonious blend of African and Chinese people 
interacting and engaging in various activities such as art, photography, celebrations, and 
gardening. The image reinforces the narrative of opportunity through a shared embrace of culture 
and language which offers improvements in quality of life through these activities. 63 Therefore, 
promotion and visual depictions on the Facebook page highlight the benefits of shared cultural 
and linguistic engagement which provides happiness and can improve an individual quality of 
life. In summary, all aspects of opportunity including cultural heritage, language, travel, quality 
of life, convenience, and employment were found across educational sources (Table C, sources 
8-10). Additionally, the three Confucius Institutions and both the Chinese and Moroccan media 
sources frequently reinforce the importance of strong diplomatic and cultural ties between both 
countries since they embrace each other’s cultural values through the “promotion of cultural 
exchange between the Arab world in general and China, which is more open to other cultures 
and civilizations.”64  
For technological narratives (Table C, sources 1-5), both dominant narratives reinforcing 
opportunity and government alignment were continually reiterated across Moroccan and Chinese 
media and institutional outlets highlighting technological projects and economic partnerships 
within Morocco.  There are four main technological investment projects found throughout 
Morocco including a smart city project in Marrakesh with Chinese company Huawei, a Police 
training course in Rabat provided by Meiya Pico Technology Firm, video surveillance equipment 
 
63 Facebook.com. Confucius Institute at University Hassan II Casablanca. Accessed June 20, 2021. 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/studyingchinese/.  
64 “Confucius Institute in Rabat.” Mohammed V University of Rabat Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences. 
Accessed 2021. http://www.flshr.ac.ma/en.  
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for Hassan II Mosque provided by Uniview, and a subsidiary along with several commercial 
partnerships with Dahua Technology, AVINA Corporation, PINET Industries, and Districap in 
Casablanca.65 A reference to the Chinese-Moroccan government economic relationship was only 
found in technology sources stressing the value of the Moroccan market for foreign investment 
within Chinese industry. For Moroccan audiences, the Dahua Technology subsidiary asserts the 
value of the Moroccan market and its strong economy are indicators for building cooperation and 
government initiatives that enable economic growth.66 Overall, the five technology sources 
reinforce the cultural, economic, and political aspects within government alignment narratives 
(Table 3, Table C). 
The analysis of opportunity narratives associated with technology found consistent 
reference to quality of life, convenience, and employment. However, notions reinforcing cultural 
and linguistic values or travel opportunities were not identified. One of the Chinese news articles 
highlights the affordability of Huawei digital devices for any audience living in Morocco, 
stating, “as a student or a business starter, you often don't have money for the big fancy brands 
like Apple.”67 The narratives continually reiterate the dominance of Huawei devices in Morocco, 
obtaining 15 percent share of the market over other dominant competitors used in the West such 
as Apple or Samsung. The opportunity narratives reinforcing convenience and quality of life are 
more often associated with Huawei technology and digital devices. Additionally, the mention of 
Huawei’s free digital devices offer to college students in the forms of tablets or video 
conferencing assistance is mentioned, further emphasizing the convenience and quality of life 
 
65 Cave, Danielle et al. “Mapping China's Tech Giants,” 2021.  
66 Dumpis, Toms. “Economic Delegation From China Visits Morocco, Talks Wind Energy.” 
https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/. Moroccan World News, April 1, 2021. Para 7.  




narratives that China promotes abroad with its technology. Overall, analysis of education and 
technology sources demonstrated various trends reinforcing narratives of opportunity and 
government alignment between Morocco and China, thereby demonstrating how these variables 




 The data compiled in this combined research approach delved into how education and 
technology are being utilized as soft power tools in Africa, proving useful to current literature 
demanding further exploration of the concepts and operationalization of soft power, particularly 
in foreign models such as China. The quantitative analysis allowed for a baseline understanding 
of where both variables are geographically present, yielding regional trends and identifying 
outlier states that present the highest amount of each variable which China can utilize to exert 
influence. The initial estimates in the hypothesis, which assumed education and technology will 
be present throughout Africa as soft power tools is accurate. The assertion that the presence of 
both variables would be higher in countries more politically and diplomatically aligned with 
China is consistent with the qualitative analysis from Morocco, however, further research would 
be required to validate this assertion. The data also supports the assumptions within the 
hypothesis based on existing literature from Wang et al., suggesting that technology will be a 
soft power tool alongside education. Additionally, narratives of opportunity and government 
alignment incorporate Chinese soft power notions of cultural heritage and economic prosperity 
that Wang et al. identify. However, it is important to note that the 10 sources yielded two 
dominant narrative trends of opportunity and government alignment which is inclusive of 
references to Chinese culture and economy. Lastly, references to China’s economic prosperity 
often cited in literature as a dominant soft power instrument were not found in the content 
analysis of Confucius Institutions, suggesting soft power initiatives utilizing education focused 
on culture. Additional research inclusive of more sources would be useful to validate these 
findings. 
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Additional research would be helpful to exploring both variables further, especially 
through alternate methodology such as a comparison of these two variables relative to other soft 
power variables (restaurants, entertainment, and other forms of media). The focus of this study 
aimed to understand a combined use of these two variables in order to improve current estimates 
on China’s soft power approaches abroad and how China is implementing its soft power 
framework. 
The data was consistent with the hypothesis indicating education and technology would 
correlate to soft power application, as the case study of Morocco denotes. The content analysis 
from the Moroccan case study and mapping of both education and technology aided in 
determining how China is creating opportunity for employing both of these variables as soft 
power mechanisms. Regionally, southern and northern Africa contains a higher presence of both 
variables than the western, central and eastern regions. The quantitative data illustrates where 
China is investing in each variable, and therefore, highlighting areas that present opportunities 
for China to exert influence through soft power.  
 Next, the qualitative case study analysis yielded observations that contextualize how each 
variable was being discussed from non-Western sources relative to each variable in context of 
Morocco. The first dominant narrative of opportunity consistency promoted concepts that 
reinforced ideas of prosperity through attending a Confucius Institute or using and supporting 
Chinese technology. More often, the promotion of a shared cultural heritage through China’s 
governmental support and presence in Morocco since the 1970’s is also commonly reiterated. 
Aspects of providing a better quality for life, convenience for any age or socio-economic status, 
and employment are associated in both education and technology variables. The category of 
government alignment as the other dominant narrative was consistently reinforced. The 
 35 
promotion of strong diplomatic ties and shared cultural values between governments was found 
in both education and technology.  
Further research can build on this research through a larger sample of sources for the 
content analysis that can provide more data for soft power analysis. Additional case studies for 
further insights and nuisances of both variables collectively or for comparison would be useful in 
understanding consistency or deviation amongst multiple African audiences.  This research study 
is limited to assessing how China is using only these two variables specifically through their 
frequency and narrative trend analysis only via Confucius Institutions and digital media 
hardware or technological services. Therefore, other forms of soft power such as film, art, food, 
language, and entertainment are not assessed. Additional educational data can be explored 
beyond the presence of Confucius Institutes and potentially encompass a broader range of 
educational variables such as research partnerships and institutional exchanges between African 
universities and Chinese universities or industry. Additional survey research, case study 
approaches, or quantitative analysis that is inclusive of a larger data set beyond education and 
technology, the case study of Morocco, or the 10 sources used for narrative analysis would be 
beneficial for further research. This study can be useful as a baseline for additional research that 
can incorporate a more nuanced research question and methodology which can provide 
additional understanding to these variables or other soft power variables that may validate these 
findings or identify new insights.   
 Lastly, this study is not aimed at assessing the efficacy of soft power on local 
populations within Africa, and instead, only assesses how China is using these tools as 
opportunity to exert influence. These findings can be useful for additional efficacy research 
attempting to measure soft power effects on local audiences since understanding how tools are 
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being implemented is fundamental before attempting to measure or assess its effectiveness. 
Therefore, these limitations can be combined with other qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, such as regression analysis, interviews, or surveys to assess how these tools are 
being utilized and the efficacy in which they are perceived locally by city, state, region, or 
continentally. Conducting this study over a longer period of time with a larger sample size can 
also enable trend analysis that can help determine how China is employing these measures and if 




 The research findings provide insight as to how education and technology are being used 
as soft power tools throughout Africa. The data suggests that education and technology are 
present throughout most of Africa, providing ample opportunity for both variables to be 
operationalized and influential as soft power mechanisms. The northern and southern regions 
contain the strongest presence of both variables with South Africa, Kenya, and Morocco 
presenting the highest amount of Chinese investment in both education and technology, thereby 
creating greater opportunity for soft-power-based influence. The case study of Morocco provides 
context to its diplomatic relations and nuances of narrative trends present in non-Western sources 
to understand how China is messaging Chinese education and technology, thus reinforcing 
opportunity and governmental alignment. Chinese and Moroccan audiences use various notions 
of opportunity and government support when discussing education and technology. The 
dominant narrative of opportunity aiming to appeal through notions of quality of life, 
convenience, and employment was consistent in both education and technology. The second 
dominant narrative of government alignment reinforces strong political and cultures ties which is 
consistent with current soft power literature highlighting the importance of culture and positives 
image of China within China’s soft power strategy. Both the qualitative and quantitative analysis 
provided insights as to how education and technology are being implemented as soft power tools 
in Africa.  
 The topic of soft power and how it is being employed, implemented, or measured will 
continue to dominant debates as strategic rhetoric underscoring the rise and threat of China 
continues. Topics concerning China’s B.R.I or the Great Power Competition remain ever-present 
in geopolitical deliberations of power politics and international relations theory. Ongoing debates 
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on soft power and its applications will benefit from further research aiming to better understand 
the nuances of soft power as a strategic political tool for states such as China. Understanding 
China’s soft power tactics and nuance are important for assessing state intent that informs U.S. 
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Mean 1.3125 Mean 1.291666667 
Standard Error 0.143278018 Standard Error 0.360946271 
Median 1 Median 0 





Sample Variance 0.98537234 Sample Variance 6.253546099 
Kurtosis 10.78536543 Kurtosis 15.30675413 
Skewness 2.862590817 Skewness 3.596992566 
Range 6 Range 14 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 6 Maximum 14 
Sum 63 Sum 62 
Count 48 Count 48 
Largest (1) 6 Largest (1) 14 
Smallest (2) 0 Smallest (2) 0 
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Country Education Technology Total Education Code Technology Code  Code Total 
Algeria 0 2 2 0 1 1 
Angola 1 2 3 1 1 2 
Benin 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Botswana 1 2 3 1 1 2 
Burkina Faso 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Burundi 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Cabo Verde 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Cameroon 2 2 4 2 1 3 
Central African 
Republic 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Chad 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Comoros 1 0 1 1 0 1 




1 0 1 1 0 1 
Egypt 2 5 7 2 2 4 
Equatorial Guinea 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Eritrea 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Ethiopia 3 2 5 3 1 4 
Gabon 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Gambia 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Ghana 2 1 3 2 1 3 
Guinea 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Guinea Basso 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Kenya 4 9 13 3 3 6 
Liberia 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Libya 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Madagascar 2 2 4 2 1 3 
Malawi 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Mali 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Mauritania 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Mauritius 1 1 2 1 1 2 
Morocco 3 4 7 3 2 5 
Mozambique 1 2 3 1 1 2 
Namibia 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Niger 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Nigeria 2 2 4 2 1 3 
North Sudan 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Rwanda 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Senegal 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Seychelles 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Sao Tome & 
Principle 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Sierra Leone 1 0 1 1 0 1 
South Africa 6 14 20 3 3 6 
Tanzania 2 2 4 2 1 3 
Togo 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Tunisia 1 1 2 1 1 2 
Uganda 1 2 3 1 1 2 
Zambia 1 3 4 1 1 2 
Zimbabwe 1 1 2 1 1 2 
 
Table B: Data coding for education and technology by country 
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Type of Source Format of Source Name of Source Brief Description Date 
1 Chinese Government68 




(Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs) 
President Xi Jinping’s phone 
conference with King 
Mahammad  
2020 
2 Moroccan Media69 News article-online Morocco World News COVID-19 Chinese aid to Morocco 2021 






for the FOCAC Beijing 
Summit-Africa 
China.org.cn Information page for the country of Morocco 2006 
5 Chinese Media72 News article-online China Daily Popularity of Chinese technology in Morocco 2021 
6 Chinese Media73 News article-online Xinhua Net Global Confucius Institute Day being celebrated in Morocco 2019 
7 Chinese Media74 News article-online Xinhua Net 
Confucius Institutes bridging 
cultural exchanges between 












Confucius Institute at Morocco 







Article under "latest 






Hassan-II University Confucius 





Chinese social media 
for local Moroccan 
students 
Facebook- University 
Hassan II Casablanca 
Confucius Institute 
Confucius Institute at University 
Hassan II Casablanca 2021 
  
 Table C: Source table for content analysis 
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Narrative Trends Code Tree 
  Definition Description 
Opportunity:  
Dominant narrative presenting various possibilities that benefit Moroccan audiences, reinforce prosperity and 
the image of China positively 
Cultural 
Heritage 
References highlighting Chinese culture 
traditions and societal values, particularly 
through shared interests and benefits of 
Mandarin 
Mandarin, Chinese language, morals, values, 
traditions, civilization, history media, 
calligraphy, art, Confucianism, culture, food, 
educational exchanges, acupuncture 
Travel 
References for possibilities or utility of 
travel outside of Morocco, particularly to 
China through education from a Confucius 
Institute or Chinese technology 
Visiting, traveling, Beijing, international 
competition “Chinese Bridge”, success 
international and popularity, expat, images of 
cities in China 
Quality of Life 
References promoting enrichment for self-
improvement in education or use of 
Chinese technology 
Crucial or integral part of someone life, business 
starter, utility of digital devices, opportune 
environment, friendships, Chinese medicine, 
Sinopharm vaccine, desire amongst Moroccans 
Convenience 
References to the ease and access pursuing 
education at a Confucius Institute or using 
Chinese technology that elevates and 
assists Morocco audiences. 
Classes, appeal and availability to all ages, 
pursuing new interests, exploring goals or 
forming hobbies, digital devices, ease, access, 
price, location, services, cutting-edge and modern 
Employment 
References to progress offered by 
education and technology that allow for 
job opportunities within Morocco or with 
Chinese industries 
Increased job qualifications, networking, access 
to Chinese industry, students, professionals, 
official services and training 
Government Alignment: 
Dominant narrative highlighting the strength and support between Moroccan and Chinese governments, 
reinforcing the image of China positively 
Diplomatic & 
Political 
References to shared political values and 
political partnership between both 
governments and government leaders 
Strategic partnerships, geostrategic position, 
bilateral cooperation, international forums, 
support for Chinese positions on Taiwan, human 
rights, consulting services for Chinese politics, 
government, foreign ministry exchanges, official 
mutual understanding, trust 
Cultural 
Values 
References to shared appreciation for 
Chinese and Moroccan values and 
tradition 
People-people exchanges, official friendly 
relations, Arab world, Chinese culture, consulting 
services for Chinese public institutes 
Economic 
References to increased benefits of having 
Chinese investment and the importance of 
Morocco and China on each other’s 
economies 
Preferred location for business, industry, 
investors, opportunities, infrastructure, B.R.I, 
technological projects, China’s reform and 
economic model or policy, economic delegation, 
government aide 
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